Abstract

This study introduces a novel tripartite non-cooperative game-theoretic model to analyze the competitiveness of inland waterway transport in emerging economies. The model captures strategic interactions among logistics operators, government agencies, and freight-generating companies, incorporating policy instruments such as subsidies and carbon taxation into the payoff structure. The methodological framework defines utility functions based on operational costs, incentives, environmental factors, and demand responses, and derives Nash equilibria under alternative policy scenarios. Results indicate that, under a combined policy of subsidies (60 units) and carbon taxation (15 units), the system converges to an equilibrium in which inland waterway transport becomes the dominant strategy. In this configuration, the logistics operator achieves a payoff of 135, while road-based alternatives generate negative returns for private companies (-80), reflecting a strong modal shift.The findings demonstrate that the underutilization of inland waterways is primarily driven by misalignment of incentives rather than technical constraints. Furthermore, the model reveals nonlinear policy effects, including diminishing returns to subsidies and asymmetric impacts of carbon taxation, highlighting the importance of coordinated and balanced policy design.By linking strategic outcomes to measurable sustainability indicators, such as emission intensity (gCO₂/ton-km), modal share, and logistics efficiency, the proposed framework provides a policy-relevant tool for supporting decarbonization strategies and sustainable logistics planning in alignment with Sustainable Development Goals.