Widely varying definitions of regionalism have emerged since the application varies among researchers. Despite the homogeneous belief in the significance of regionalism and regional integration in contemporary international politics, scholars' variation in the paradigm adopted shows epistemological differences. In other words, scholars conceive regionalism differently based on contextual variation across disciplines [19]. A precise definition of regionalism has proved elusive. According to a definition provided by Börzel and Rissel-Kappen, regionalism is ‘ a state-led process of building and sustaining formal regional institutions and organizations among at least three states’[20]. Regionalism, in this view, is a constellation of nation-states' efforts based on shared values and identity. Similarly, Fawcett sees regionalism as the policies and practices of an organization whose membership is restricted to states within the same geographical region [21]. Despite the purposive harmonization of states to form a formidable regional institution, the state interactions and membership vary on social, political, and security concerns [22]. Advancing this argument, Baylis explains that different regional arrangements between states are usually in the form of cooperation and integration. Therefore, the focus of this research is on the former. Theoretically, regionalism remains contested for its ‘unavoidable empirical ambiguity’ and diverse analytical perspectives [23].

The conceptual bifurcation of regionalism has attributed enormous attention to its root word- ‘region' as a valuable beginning to circumvent the ontological problem faced in defining regionalism [24]. In other words, several definitions of regionalism hinge on the demographic proximity of states whose interaction is determined by the shared geographical location [25]. However, the fundamental challenge remains the agreement among scholars on what constitutes a region. For example, Cantori and Spiegel highlight features of a region including geographical proximity, shared socio-cultural and ethnic identity, and inter-state interaction [26]. Consequently, a considerable amount of literature predicated the conceptual analysis of regionalism on social cohesiveness; common heritage, ethnicity, socio-linguistic bond, religious belief, political cohesiveness; ideological resonance, regime type, and institutional similarities [27]. The geographical proximity is insufficient to define the ‘regioness’ of an organization, instead the purpose of socio-economic and political interaction [28]. Therefore, adopting a definition that encompasses this conceptual divergence is essential. Although opinion differences still exist, there appears to be some agreement that regionalism, irrespective of the phases, whether early, old, or new, refers to an organized move to protect states and regional preferences.

The review of old regional organizations and the formation of new ones after the Cold War significantly influenced the wave of neo-regionalism debate. These modifications were done to accommodate new actors and organizations and broaden the scope of regional institutions. However, the history of old regionalism is inseparable from the new regionalism because of institutional overlapping. Several regional organizations were established during the old regionalism epoch (the 1950s-1970s) but these were re-instituted during neo-regionalism around the 1980s- 1990s to broaden the scope of membership and feature new political realities [20]. Therefore, new regionalism is a post-Cold War phenomenon.

Similarly, the new regionalism is a product of a global transformation project conducted under the auspices of the United Nations University and World Institute for Development Economic Research, conducted to interrogate the significance of the region in the new world order [29]. In other words, the transition of global order from bipolar to multipolar shortly after the Cold War warranted the change in the region and state-based organizations to conform with the new emerging world order. Hence, new regionalism embraces formal and informal interaction among states and non-state actors, usually civil societies, and private companies. However, despite the burgeoning interest in new regionalism research, scholars have applied descriptive and historical approaches in advancing the discussion on new regionalism. Therefore, conceptual and theoretical exploration remains limited.

The new trend of regionalism embodies regional cooperation, given the decline in the capacity of integration theories to explain the emergence of new global realities. Regardless of the nature of the engagement, the regional organization that emerged after the Second World War moved beyond the regional boundary and organized above the state [30]. The engagement of non-state actors intensified regional and interregional cooperation as the new mode of global interaction. Regional cooperation has become an essential driver in promoting regionalism, especially cooperation that extends beyond economic collaboration.

The new regionalism is, to some extent, distinct from the old regionalism. The first point of distinction is the scope of membership. The first wave of the regional grouping, which spanned between the 1950s to 1960s was characterized by homogeneous regional institutions. At the same time, the new regionalism is epitomized by socio-economic, cultural, and political diversification, which pervade the structural arrangement of the new regional organization. Secondly, the new regional organization embraces multilateralism and trade liberalization, making the new institutions open to regional cooperation [31]. However, the degree of institutionalization varies because of the avoidance of old institutional structures and the search for a new mode of organization.

Like the previous conceptual analysis, interregionalism is also deficient in a universally accepted definition because it lacks a homogeneous appearance. This variation has limited theoretical postulation on interregionalism. Therefore, the theoretical research on interregionalism is unequivocally thin. The fundamental question is the intersection between regionalism and interregionalism. To begin with, regionalism emanates from the cooperation between two or more regional entities represented by the government or administrative unit. The emergence of interregionalism has been popularized by the European Union's foreign policy, which extends to different regions. The application of interregionalism to a wide range of interregional cooperation has shown heterogeneity in the conceptualization. Thus, interregionalism is a multifaceted phenomenon.

To add more nuance to the theoretical discussion of interregional cooperation and its application to the Africa-EU partnership, this section explores the dynamics of interregionalism. The external relation of interregional organizations shows a multiplicity of relations than their internal functionality. The major types of interregionalism are pure-regionalism, hybrid or quasi interregionalism and transregionalism. Pure regionalism is the cooperation between two institutionalized regional organizations. For instance, the relationship between the EU and ASEAN exemplifies group-to-group relations or pure regionalism [32]. Hybrid or quasi-regionalism is a relationship between a well-established regional organization and a country from another region. In other words, hybrid or quasi interregionalsim is an engagement between a region and a state. The third form of interregionalism, transregionalism, shows overlapping in the relationship between regions. Therefore, the typological ambiguities in interregionalism show the dynamics of the EU's external relations with state and non-state entities.

Interregional cooperation has undeniably put the EU forward as an active actor in international politics. The rationale for the EU's engagement in interregional cooperation includes the interest in stimulating regional development, global relevance, and capacity building [33]. The unequal power relation in the EU inter-regional relation has become an object of contestation among scholars. For an effective relation to exist between two regions, there must be parity in the level of ‘actorship’ [34]. Otherwise, the relation becomes superordinate-subordinate relations.

In the case of Africa-EU relations, the fragmented relations between the EU and some African states that preceded JAES, such as the Lome and Cotonou agreements [35] could be classified as a quasi or hybrid interregionalism in which the partners had unequal institutional capacities. The early cooperation between Africa and the EU was based on a donor-recipient approach. This cooperation was organized on a country level which denied region counterpart relation. The EU's policy was then centred on helping Africa integrate African states to build institutional capacity. However, the formation of JAES has transformed Africa-EU relations to a pure interregionalism through the established strategic partnership between AU and the EU. Therefore, one of the theoretical contributions of this paper is to classify Africa-EU interregional cooperation as pure interregionalism, given the typology of Hänngi on interregionalism. The only Africa-EU relation that has been classified as a region-to-region relation (pure interregionalism) is the relations between the EU and Southern African Development Communities (SADC) [32]. Nevertheless, the emergence of strategic relations between the AU and EU remains a monumental contribution to the discussion of interregionalism.

The theoretical reflection of neoliberalism on Africa-EU relations explains the essence of international cooperation. The theoretical position of realism on international cooperation contrasts with the neoliberal assumption on the same subject. According to the realist, conflict is inevitable in the anarchical structure of the world, which essentially shapes states' interaction. Therefore, the possibility of cooperation is limited. However, neoliberal theory negates this pessimistic view of attaining international peace and cooperation. Neoliberals maintain that international institutions are significant in attaining international cooperation [11]. The interaction of states through the formation of an institutional framework neutralizes the possibility of conflict through international capacity distribution, which underplays the essence of power acquisition among the states. However, it claims that it is inconsequential to symbolize the world with conflict inevitability.

The neoliberal argument on absolute gain illuminates the nature of the partnership between Africa and the EU. However, somewhat literature has described the Africa-EU relationship as an asymmetric relationship. However, the transformation of the relationship from a donor control mechanism to a cooperation base supports the claim of absolute gain, which governs the current Africa-EU affairs. The argument of relative gain may not be tenable because of its zero-sum game attribution. In other words, what a state loses benefits other parties. Therefore, the absolute gain is suitable for interpreting the inherent benefit of the interregional relation between the AU and the EU. International cooperation is not necessarily predicated on the self-interest of the state or relative gain but on pursuing fundamental values like peace, equality, and justice [12]. The EU is built on the liberal values extended to Africa through regional support and interregional partnership. The commitment of the EU to promoting peace, human rights, and democratic governance has been demonstrated in thematic areas of JAES.

According to neoliberals, the fundamental goals in state interaction are national security and economic cooperation. Nevertheless, neoliberals accentuate more on the economy than support for internal military capabilities [36]. The EU's interest was primarily on how to support Africa in building internal peace and increasing security capabilities, while Africa's interest lies in trade and economic development. Consequently, Africa-EU relations have received internal legitimacy given the economic support embedded in the new cooperation.

However, neoliberals' argument relies heavily on international cooperation without addressing systemic factors that could hamper the possibility of state cooperation. This assertion is supported by the argument that neoliberal institutionalism fails to recognize ‘international anarchy’ as a stumbling block to international cooperation [37]. Therefore, the main weakness of neoliberalism is further stressed in Axelrod and Keohane's observation that cooperation in international politics may be an uphill task because of the absence of a central authority to enforce the law, and the international institutions are equally fragile. Thus far, the theoretical framework has explained the conceptual variations and scholarship positions on regionalism, neo-regionalism, and interregionalsim and their sequential transition.

This section analyses one of the thematic areas of JAES (Africa-EU Energy Partnership-AEEP) to keep the analysis detailed and sparse. It is necessary to briefly explain energy governance in Africa and the EU to understand the peculiarities and institutional differences in this governance domain and how it has necessitated interregional cooperation. The general use of the term 'governance' is sometimes equated with interrelated activities, which include the process of decision-making, organizing, and steering the affairs of a particular entity. Similarly, the Commission on Global Governance report defines governance as "the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private manage their common affairs" [48]. Therefore, governance is a way through which conflicting and diverse interests are managed. Concerning the energy sector, energy governance is the institutional arrangement and coordination of actors involved in the politics and policy of energy resources. Relatedly, energy governance is the process of driving the provision of energy services through established law and policy formulation coordinated by private and public actors [49]. Thus, energy governance is characterized by a multiplicity of actors engaged in national and international interactions to coordinate the agenda of global energy affairs. In other words, the dynamics of energy governance drivers and structure have been classified into intergovernmental Organizations (International Energy Agency- IEA), International non-governmental organizations (Environmental and Energy Study Institute- EESI), regional organizations (APEC), and Global financial institutions (World Bank) [50].

The Africa-EU relationship on energy governance demonstrates two contrasting regions ranging from a contrasting technological strength in driving power generation, transmission, distribution, and energy accessibility. Nevertheless, the possibility of comparative advantage between the two regions remains a source of cohesion in pursuing energy transition. Moreover, it is incontrovertible that each region's peculiarities of energy predicaments attract a practical approach through energy partnership and institutional support. Moreover, the imperative of mutual interactions between Africa and the EU is ignited by the perceived global energy challenges such as climate change and energy security which demand energy diversification and attention to renewable energy sources [51]. Therefore, the objectives of the energy partnership in the two regions are centred on energy security, energy efficiency, access to energy resources, and clean and affordable energy.

The EU economy, over decades, has been built and entrenched in carbon-based energy. Therefore, the EU energy governance is key to economic development in European countries. Historical retrospection on the emergence of the EU shows the significance of trade policy as a propelling force for developing energy governance in Europe. The analysis from Knodt and Kemmerzell [52] on the EU energy governance linked the existence of the European Coal and Steel Company (ECSC) and the European Atomic Energy Company (EURATOM) to the governance of energy resources in Europe. The establishment of the Coal and Steel Community and EUROSTAT in 1951 and 1957 respectively, prepared the ground for energy governance in Europe. Not until the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, when central coordination became the new order, the decisions on energy resources in Europe were subjected to Secondary law that was within the state members' competency. One of the profound impacts of the Lisbon Treaty was the transfer of energy competency from a secondary law to a primary statute, as contained in Article 194 of the Treaty on the Function of European Union (TFEU), which allowed the supranational institution to deliberate on the issue of energy concern. Nevertheless, the capabilities to extract energy resources lie within the jurisdiction of the member states. Therefore, the EU energy governance has been motivated toward achieving three critical goals: energy security, sustainability, and competition through the integration of the internal energy market. These objectives reflect the degree of energy import and dependency within Europe, which later formed the core strategy of the energy union to alleviate the effect of energy hegemony [53]. Consequently, the EU energy policy has shifted somewhat attention to renewable energy sources (RES) to achieve the earlier stated energy policy objectives through the instituted green energy deal by exploring the internal capability of regenerative energy.

The promotion of renewable energy sources in the EU energy field is not only premised on the expression and ambition to be the first carbon-free continent but also on the institutional configuration that drives the policy instruments toward achieving energy security through RES. Similarly, the establishment of a distinct governance instrument (Governance of Energy Union and Climate Action) facilitated the EU effort on the 2030 energy transition objective. However, the contestation against the desirability of RES within supranational and national levels in the EU demonstrates politicization and energy polarization [54].

To juxtapose energy governance in Africa, it maintains a distance posture given the absence of supranational institutions that govern energy affairs in Africa. However, the defunct Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union (AU), instituted the African Energy Commission (AFREC) through the Lusaka Convention on the African Energy Commission of July 2001, which was later ratified in December 2006 [55]. However, the commission lacks the authority to govern the AU member states' energy decisions harmoniously. Consequently, there are disparities in the level of internal ratification of the article of this convention among the 54 member states of the AU, which are equal members of AFREC. Moreover, Article 3b of the Convention of the African Energy Commission (CAEC) stresses the imperative of joint development of energy resources through cooperation in energy sectors among member states to promote regional and subregional projects [56]. Similarly, the lack of a central institutionalized governing mechanism has spawned fragmented sub-regional institutions saddled with the similar responsibility of advocating access to sustainable energy. For instance, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), in partnership with the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the EU, launched an energy governance program in Abuja, Nigeria, in 2018 to strengthen energy governance in West Africa [57].

Despite the fragmented institutional structure of energy governance, which is evident in regional (AU) and subregional organizations in Africa, the common denominator remains the ambitious move to bridge the gap in energy access. The AU's objective of alleviating energy poverty and promoting universal access to clean and sustainable energy is jointly shared across sub-regions of Africa. This position has been demonstrated in the 41st session of the AU Executive Council, where all member states unanimously agreed on deploying available energy resources to enhance energy access and just transition [58]. On the other hand, ECOWAS has geared efforts towards increasing 35% of the West African Population that has access to electricity. Similarly, ECOWAS regional intervention in energy plight has been institutionalized with the Regional Renewable Energy Policy (RREP) through the construction of the Regional Off-Grid Electricity Access Project (ROGEP), funded by the World Bank, which intends to provide universal access to electricity in West Africa by 2030 [59]. Nonetheless, the methodology adopted by the AU with the fundamental objectives of the African Energy Commission (AFREC) has promoted collaborative effort both within and outside Africa. Therefore, the goals of AFREC, which include the development of energy policies, mobilization of technical and financial support for member states, and implementation of capacity-building programs [60] are in consonant with the objective of this empirical interrogation.

It is crucial to reiterate that the challenge of energy governance in Africa is not extremely distant from other governance problems such as environmental, water scarcity, and food insecurity which are mainly addressed with a national approach. Moreover, the constraints in governance capacity in Africa are predominantly attributed to limited financial and economic capabilities [61].

Africa is undoubtedly rich in natural resources. However, the paradoxical state of socio-political and economic realities in Africa has been a source of scholarly concern [62]. There is a need to widen the access to electricity across African sub-regions to stimulate socio-economic development. In other words, economic development remains a mirage where 6 million population have no access to energy, and about 730 million rely on traditional biomass as the source of energy [63]. Therefore, energy demand, supply, and consumption are directly linked to the general standard of living, quality of life, and economic development [46]. The availability of energy resources in Africa is incoherent and incomplete because of the under-exploration of the available resources.

Nevertheless, renewable and non-renewable energy sources immensely contribute to power generation in Africa. The geographical advantage accrued to the abundant energy resources in Africa has triggered more international cooperation to tap into renewable energy and aid energy transition. The conventional energy sources in the African region have been the mainstay of economic development in many sub-regions of Africa. In other words, 50% of the energy supply in the African continent is derived from fossil fuels, including coal, oil, and natural gas [64]. On renewable energy, the rate of solar irradiation in Africa has boosted the deployment of solar photovoltaic (PV) and solar thermal to diversify energy sources. Despite the enormous potential of solar energy, below 25% of the African population is effectively engaged in solar energy [65]. However, sub-regional preferences for different sources of energy explain the divide in the degree of energy accessibility. For instance, solar and wind energy are actively deployed in North Africa with 98% energy accessibility, while West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa have leveraged less on solar technology with low energy accessibility of 47%, 23%, 25% and 48% respectively [66].

For further elaboration on the African endowment of energy resources, it is necessary to demonstrate the diversity of these resources based on the regional constellation. A significant chunk of oil and gas reserves are situated in West and North Africa, with 90% in Algeria, Nigeria, Sudan, Libya, and Angola, while the Republic of South Africa contributes the largest coal deposit [67]. Similarly, ten percent of the world mining output of Uranium belongs to Malawi [68]. However, the Koeberg nuclear power plant in South Africa remains the only nuclear power station in Africa. Although, no sub-region in Africa has a legitimate monopoly in deploying renewable technology. However, the intervention of private investors and international institutions has given more prominence to some countries in adopting renewable energy. Nonetheless, the daily distribution of solar irradiation within Africa is relatively homogeneous because approximately 85% of the African topography attracts about 2000 kWh per year [69]. Other energy sources like geothermal and wind are under-used. Table 1 shows the synopsis of Africa's potential in renewable energy.

The division of Africa into three regions based on energy performance, North Africa, South Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, has shown that the bulk of the challenge confronting energy generation lies in the latter. Therefore, the African energy sector is still at a crossroads, given the technological demand to transit from conventional energy sources. Even though, energy transition needs to be preceded by universal access to energy because, without general accessibility, there is nothing to transition from [71]. To corroborate this argument, it is interesting to know that oil-producing countries in the sub-Sharan region, such as Nigeria and Ghana, lack the technological capability to refine the quantity of crude oil demanded while spending a significant portion of national income on oil importation to meet energy demand [72]. Amidst these contradictions and vast energy potentials, the solution to the energy woes could be the creation of an institutional mechanism to enhance energy governance in Africa through regional cooperation and public-private partnerships.

Aside from the regular institutional structure, which includes academics, professionals, and technical officers in the energy field, stakeholders' engagement in decision-making on energy issues epitomizes AEEP intervention in Africa. Hence, energy governing capacity is revamped through research and innovation. The Africa-EU partnership on renewable energy has shown the need to broaden the horizon of all actors advocating energy sustainability by acquiring the necessary skills and knowledge to combat the energy challenges in Africa. In other words, the interregional energy cooperation between Africa and Europe is beyond rhetoric and political discussion. Therefore, research and innovation have become a new point of convergence for Africa-EU interaction to speed up the provision of clean and affordable energy across Africa and Europe. For instance, the Long-term Europe-Africa Partnership on Renewable Energy (LEAP-RE), a program coordinated by the Euro-African consortium in collaboration with the European Commission, is a veritable platform for knowledge transfer for private and public stakeholders in the African energy sector [73]. Moreover, the LEAP-RE program exemplifies a research-driven approach adopted by the AU-EU alliance to uplift Africa's poor energy generation and supply. Therefore, the initiation of the LEAP-RE program is immersed with the primary focus of Africa- EU energy cooperation. However, three distinct areas of its intervention are worthy of explanation. The first and second pillars of the program encompass the implementation of a multinational and individual research proposal, innovation, and capacity building, respectively, while the third pillar emphasizes the management phase and the sustenance of interregional renewable energy governance between AU and the EU [47].

The interest of AEEP in propagating renewable energy within the African and EU member states informed the engagement in technical training to upskill the energy entrepreneurs whose strategic position at the grassroots is significant for the promotion of access to novel energy sources. Moreover, the increase in technological know-how is requisite for the global renewable energy campaign, which has become AEEP's methodological stance in capacity building. In addition, among the interventions of AEEP on energy training and knowledge transfer is the 'Renewable Energy Project Design and Development’ organized in conjunction with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 's Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (SACREEE) [74]. The Workshop was designed to provide technicians in the energy field with vocational training on renewable energy resources planning, design, and installation of the solar system. Therefore, the Africa-EU cooperation on energy has been a product of shared values which propels the commitment to solve future energy challenges through collective action.

Multilevel coordination and the inclusion of public sector organizations are crucial for achieving AEEP objectives on regional electricity transmission and widening the access to power supply. The reality of the energy sector in Africa has attracted multilateral energy support and stakeholders ranging from the private to public sector, which invariably increased the quantum of official development assistance (ODA) in Africa [75]. However, the fulcrum of this institutional and international support for energy is to implement low-carbon energy. Its efficacy rests on the mutual coordination between AEEP and public sector organizations in the host countries. The second AEEP high-level meeting (HLM) that took place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in 2014 received the presence of energy ministers of the AU member states and energy experts, which defines the significance of inclusiveness in energy dialogue. Similarly, The energy decision-makers in Sub-Saharan Africa including ministries of energy, rural electrification, renewable energy agencies, power regulators, and other national energy-concerned institutions have been charged to take an active role in stimulating general electrification through clean energy sources [76].

The AEEP energy stakeholder forum remains an exceptional platform bringing people of diverse dexterity in the energy field to achieve the goals of energy efficiency, energy security, and energy access. The first AEEP stakeholder forum took place in Cape Town in May 2010 with 250 representatives from private and public domain, researchers, civil society organizations, government officials, and financial institutions [77]. The essence of the forum is to synergize efforts toward monitoring the progress in the energy transition. Moreover, the central concern of the forum remains how to invigorate the investment in renewable energy through support from private investors, which explains the notion of "three stakeholders group, two continents, and one joint responsibility" [78]. Therefore, an intense collaboration between institutions and private bodies is inevitable to manifest AEEP's demand for the wide distribution of renewable energy resources. Following the initiation of the energy stakeholder forum, the stakeholder consultations which were carried out in Ghana, Djibouti, Uganda, Cameroon, and Zambia extended the scope of intergovernmental partnership through the engagement of various civil society and public organization to promote the interest of AEEP on rural electrification and unrestricted access to electricity (AEEP, 2014).

It is worth knowing that AEEP is just one of the partnerships and alliances aiding the revitalization of the energy sector in Africa. The other establishments include Africa Energy Group, the Programme for Infrastructural Development in Africa (PIDA), and Sustainable Energy for All (SE4ALL). All these 'high-level initiates', including AEEP, have shown concern about raising institutional capacity to unlock Africa's energy potential. Within the scope of AEEP, the implementation of clean and accessible energy projects has attracted the creation of different initiatives and programs with the primary aim of tackling energy challenges within Europe and Africa. In other words, the energy alliance between Africa and Europe has produced frameworks like the EU Energy Initiative (EUEI) created to eradicate energy poverty and the Partnership Dialogue Facility (PDF) to manage energy projects and coordinate regional and international energy policy discourse. The EU Partnership Dialogue has aided regional energy partnerships not only in Africa but also in Latin America, the Pacific, and Southeast Asia and most notably served as the secretariat for the Africa-EU joint strategy on energy.

Although Africa is incontrovertibly self-sufficient in energy resources, as previously explained. However, the realization of the full potential requires financial and technical intervention to consolidate its efforts in tapping into the variety of energy resources. Therefore, the need to mobilize financial and technical resources has been a mutual reality that characterizes the Africa-EU energy support to fulfill the sustainable development goal 7. For example, out of the 24.4 billion euros appropriated for official development assistance (ODA) by the EU, 11.1 billion euros have been committed to energy projects in Africa [79]. In addition, multilateral institutions have largely supported the procurement and installation of renewable energy components such as solar PV, and wind turbines, and bearing other necessary economic consequences to haste energy transition in Europe and Africa. The predominant contributors to energy projects in Africa are the African Development Bank (ADB), the EU, and the World Bank [75]. Various African states receive energy support in the form of aid and loans from the mentioned international institutions.

The provision of technical assistance in energy generation and transmission has aided the quest towards meeting energy demand in Africa, most especially in the sub-Saharan region, where there is a considerable lacuna between total energy demand and quantity of energy generated. The deployment of renewable energy technology remains the mode of technical assistance in Africa. Contrastingly, the Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations contends that the transition of the energy field in African countries surpasses the importation of technological devices rather than raising internal and local technological innovation to build needed renewable energy generators [80]. The absence of local arrangements for energy production, and the over-reliance on fossil fuels to sustain industrial production may thwart the efforts on clean energy provision. Nevertheless, the significant amount of assistance African countries receive on energy reform comes from technical support. For instance, data from the AEEP report shows that 84 percent of energy aids are technical assistance while 64 percent provide direct funds [75].

The mobilization of technical equipment in Africa to increase power generation from renewable energy has yielded colossal results over the years. Detailed analysis of power generation from renewable sources shows that hydropower is Africa's leading technology in grid supply. From 2010 to 2015, an additional 2,174 megawatts were recorded from hydropower generation through AEEP support in restoring collapsed hydropower plants to increase efficiency in power generation across African countries [81]. On the other hand, the projection of AEEP in extending the power generation from solar sources by 500 megawatts in 2020 was far reached before the slated time. Comparatively, the total solar installation capacity as of 2016 was 1,546 megawatts compared to 2010, with a total installed capacity of 130 megawatts. Similarly, wind and other renewable energy sources are not exempted from AEEP's scope in building energy capacity for regional transmission within Africa and between Africa and Europe.